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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

IS THERE RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE?[1]

THE question has been generally dismissed by empirical and analytic philosophers. They regard those who would answer yes as out of touch with the results of their criticism. Intelligent discussion between them is nil. But one cannot avoid their analysis and criticism. It is a fire of purification. A new conception is possible precisely because of their analyses.

My strategy is: (1) to distinguish various kinds of knowledge or uses of the term "knowledge"; (2) to present the characteristics of each kind; and (3) to ask if typical religious claims belong to any of the kinds. By kinds of knowledge I do not mean the old two-compartment view of truth by faith and reason. I reject this. I have in mind as examples what are often called formal knowledge (logic, mathematics) and empirical knowledge. I discover that religious claims do not fit in any of these kinds. But in the process the criteria for a kind of knowledge are focused. We then take a fresh look at religious claims from the perspective that "the meaning of a statement is a function of its use" and with our criteria attempt to formulate a kind of religious knowledge.

Russell has made current a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. To have knowledge by acquaintance is to be aware of one's own direct experience. What is thus open to direct experience is a matter of debate. Let us take, as common ground, sensory experience, feelings, moods, emotions (I see red; I feel sad; I'm down-in-the-dumps; I hate spinach). Knowledge by acquaintance is: (1) private to each person having that acquaintance; (2) communicable to others only by analogy to their private acquaintance in similar situations; (3) neither true nor false; (4) immediate rather than inferential; and (5) subjective, that is, requiring the presence of a person having the experience.

The third characteristic, neither true nor false, requires comment. If we ask what it means to say "I feel a pain" is true, the

[1] Presented at the 53rd annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Philadelphia, December 28, 1956.

answer is that we are quite sure we are having the experience called feeling a pain. Thus, to say a knowledge-by-acquaintance statement is true is equivalent to saying with emphasis that we are having such and such an acquaintance. "Is true" means "is experienced." Consequently "is false" would mean "is not experienced." But, by definition, if it is not experienced, then it is not knowledge by acquaintance. Hence "is false" has no meaning with respect to knowledge by acquaintance, and correspondingly all such knowledge is true. "Is true" is then redundant. It seems sensible to conclude that, if "is false" has no significant use and "is true" is superfluous, knowledge by acquaintance is neither true nor false.

From another angle, suppose you doubt that someone else has a particular acquaintance, are there any rules of justification you both could appeal to for settling the disagreement? No. His honest report of his experience is all you have. No public justification procedures are available. For this reason, as well as the lack of significant use for true or false, it is misleading to call this knowledge. To avoid this confusion, I call them "acquaintance claims."

If religious statements, no matter what we decide later they are, are held to express acquaintance claims, it follows for the reasons we gave that there is *not* religious knowledge. It is important to make this clear at the outset so that this possibility will not remain an option as the analysis proceeds. Those who talk in religion about personal experience and mystical experience fall into this category. Rational discussion is impossible. This conclusion is often admitted under analysis but later on the psychological urge to move from acquaintance to knowledge claims takes over. This phantom bridge is a major fallacy in religious thinking. We cannot infer justifiable knowledge claims from unjustifiable acquaintance claims. I must emphasize that I do not deny the occurrence of religious experience but I do insist that we recognize its status.

Knowledge by description consists of assertions that state certain properties or relations about some objects (events, entities). In contrast to the characteristics of knowledge by acquaintance it is: (1) public in principle as information for anybody; (2) communicable without repetition of the process whereby it was obtained; (3) true or false, that is, acceptable or rejectable according to some appropriate rules of justification; (4) inferential in most cases; and (5) objective, that is, any trained inquirer will arrive via the rules of justification at the same result. The third characteristic (true or false) calls for a general comment.

We face a linguistic choice. On the one hand we can say there is a broad usage of "true" and "false" as follows. Given our various kinds of knowledge by description (formal, empirical, ethical, etc.) and their distinct rules of justification we can say that acceptable assertions according to the rules are true whatever the kind of knowledge. Hence there are, on this usage, many kinds of trues; for example: logically or formally true, empirically true, ethically true. On the other hand there is a narrow usage of true; namely, empirically true within empirical science. If we use true or false in the narrow sense, then we require pairs of appraisal terms for acceptable and rejectable assertions in the other kinds of knowledge by description. Some of these are current; for formal knowledge: valid or invalid, consistent or inconsistent, etc.; for ethical knowledge: good or bad, right or wrong, ought or ought not (nought), etc. So far as I can tell, this issue is a linguistic choice. Do not ask me, what is the real truth? I do not understand the meaning of this question. I do not use the terms "truth" or "fact." I prefer to choose the narrow sense of true in order to distinguish very sharply one kind of knowledge from another; to signalize the very different rules of justification employed with their different appraisal terms. This is why I ask "Is there religious knowledge?" rather than "Is there religious truth?"

Why do I maintain that there are different kinds of knowledge by description? It is one of the significant contributions of logical positivism to have made clear the difference between formal and empirical knowledge. They cleared the way. I want to summarise this difference and using their insights go on to add further kinds for my purpose.

Formal knowledge by description is exemplified by logic, mathematics, and games. One well-known classic exposition of it is the essay by Hempel "On the Nature of Mathematical Truth."[2] Three aspects are important to our purpose: subject matter, rules of justication, and characteristics. Modern developments in logic and mathematics made clear its formal character. This meant that formal knowledge has no one particular subject matter. The terms and relations of its postulate sets are capable of alternative interpretations. One might say that its symbols do not have reference to anything else; they are just happy little symbols. Rules of justification include some set of proof rules (like modus ponens and substitution) and conditions (like consistency, completeness,

[2] In Feigl & Sellars: *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949.

well-formed formulae). To justify a theorem as valid requires showing how it can be obtained from the postulates via proof rules. To justify some system we try to prove its consistency and completeness. Beyond this, if we are asked to justify our selection of postulates the answer is convenience or just fun. Of course, if we have in mind an interpretation, certain pragmatic goals guide our choice.

The characteristics of formal knowledge are: (1) it is *formal*, giving no information about nature or any other referent; (2) theorems are *not true or false* in the usual sense but valid or invalid; (3) postulates are not true or false, or valid or invalid; they are *convenient* or *arbitrary choices;* (4) such choice provides *alternative* systems organized in a *rigorous* fashion; (5) given the postulates and proof rules, theorems can be established that are *necessary* and *certain.*

With these characteristics we are ready for our first test: do religious assertions belong to formal knowledge by description? We only need to indicate what assertions are religious before a crystal-clear answer can be given. At this stage I want to include in religious assertions a large and heterogeneous class associated with any world religion (Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, Mohammedan, etc.). We can recognize the following groups; you provide your own concrete illustrations: (1) theological truth claims concerning God and His relation to man and nature; (2) cosmological truth claims about the origin, structure, and purpose of the universe; (3) historical truth claims concerning special events of religious significance; (4) ethical judgments; and (5) religious utterances about life as in the Sermon on the Mount. Later on I will give my own description of a religious assertion. One advantage of our approach is that it can deal sharply with this heterogeneous class.

Back to the question. It is quite clear that none of these assertions is formal; in sharp contrast, they all have specific reference. Assertions in all five groups are usually regarded as true, not just as valid. Basic beliefs are not regarded as a matter of convenience or arbitrary, nor are alternative systems recognized as legitimate. There have been some efforts, as in Thomas Aquinas, to develop a rigorous system; but this is the exception, not the rule, and the rigor is questionable. Finally, there might appear to be a similarity on the last characteristic: necessity and certainty. But examination shows a vast difference. When religious assertions are claimed to be necessary and certain, they are held to be absolute truths, the one and only. When a theorem of some formal system is said to be necessary and certain, it is so relative to some set

of postulates and proof rules. Its necessity is relative and hypothetical. This was not the case according to earlier conceptions of mathematics, in which the postulates were regarded as self-evident truths providing necessary knowledge about nature. On this parallel, theology provided necessary knowledge about supernature; but this earlier similarity is impossible now. Failure to satisfy any one of the characteristics is sufficient to show that the claim does not belong to that kind of knowledge. Our conclusion on every count is clear: religious assertions do not belong to formal knowledge. The analysis so clear in this case will help us through the following complex cases.

Empirical knowledge by description is exemplified by natural, social, and historical sciences, and everyday information. Its subject matter has been variously described (nature, the external world, the space-time order, phenomenal experience), but there is, I think, general procedural agreement that it deals with events and objects for which operational definitions can be given and/or unobservable objects that are linked by logical-mathematical relations to operationally defined objects. Much technical analysis has been done in connection with the procedures of justification (verification, confirmation, hypothetical-deduction, induction), but the differences do not affect our argument.

The characteristics of empirical knowledge are: (1) it provides *concrete information* about or explanations of our experience or nature; (2) this information is *testable;* (3) the testing procedures are *public;* and (4) the logic of the testing procedures renders the information *probable,* never certain. As a consequence of testability and publicity, the information is *objective.* The analysis and defense of these characteristics is well known.

Do religious claims belong to empirical knowledge? Yes and no. Of the five types of religious claims the cosmological and historical might appear to give empirical information. Although made with this intention, they fail to provide empirical information on two counts: (1) they often claim certainty; and (2) they are not open to experimental test. If they claim to be only probable and specify the experimental test, we simply hand them over to the relevant science and there is no longer anything distinctively religious about them. To my knowledge such experimental tests have not been specified. But other procedures of justification have been: revelation, authority, intuitive insight, and mystical experience. It is clear that none of these belongs to empirical testing. Further, if these were acceptable testing procedures, they would fail in most cases to meet the condition of publicity. Finally,

religious claims are often advanced as certain truths while empirical knowledge is probable.

On the other hand, suppose religious claims are advanced as probable with public means of justification about a new area of empirical data? This is possible and is worth exploration. Later I suggest one lead. We must not block the road to inquiry.

I turn to ethical knowledge. My strategy is now quite clear. Ethical assertions can be recognized by the following predicates, implicit or explicit, or their synonyms: right or wrong, good or bad, ought or ought not. This is how I delineate the subject matter. Procedures of justification are various and a matter of serious discussion. For my purpose I shall use the general patterns presented in Feigl's essay: "Validation and Vindication: An Analysis of the Nature and Limits of Ethical Arguments."[3] Given a specific ethical judgment, three moves for acceptance or rejection occur: (1) it is claimed to be self-evident; (2) it is shown to be in accord with some set of basic ethical principles; or (3) it is shown to lead to the realization of some ultimate ends. Basic principles and ultimate ends are, by definition, not justifiable except in terms of one another, leading to a cycle of justification.

Characteristics are not so clear. The following seem sufficient for my argument: (1) the presence of prescriptive statements concerning good, right, and ought; (2) the existence of alternative positions regarding principles or ends without public and objective tests for adjudicating conflicting views; (3) the difference in meaning between "ought" and "is"; and (4) the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values.

Do religious claims belong to ethical knowledge? Yes and no. It is quite clear that the theological, cosmological, and historical types fall out because they are not prescriptive statements. But it is equally clear that each world religion does contain ethical judgments. It is important to notice that the ethical judgments belonging to a religion usually depend for all or part of their justification on certain theological, cosmological, or historical claims, while non-religious ethical judgments do not require this sort of basis. This difference in basis is important because, when a call for justification is made, a religious ethical judgment cannot complete its defense within ethical knowledge alone. Any adequate account of the meaning of religious assertions must do justice to this frequent connection of ethics and religion.

Our analysis has shown that religious assertions in general do

[3] In Sellars & Hospers: *Readings in Ethical Theory*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952.

not belong to formal, empirical, or ethical knowledge, although some assertions are empirical or ethical and as such are properly understood and tested in those kinds of knowledge. What makes them religious we have yet to isolate. This brief delineation of kinds of knowledge indicates the criteria we must meet for a separate kind of religious knowledge. First we have to specify the subject matter or realm of data or type of statement such that it can be distinguished from other kinds of knowledge; and, second, to specify the rules of justification for accepting or rejecting statements. Any theory must account for (1) a common link for the presence in religion of such diverse claims as theological, cosmological, ethical, etc.; (2) the tenacity with which religious assertions are held; (3) why treatment of religious assertions via some other kind of knowledge seems to "miss the boat" for religious people; and (4) the meaning of some assertions, which I called religious utterances, that do not fit into any of the known kinds.

Can we construct a separate kind of religious knowledge? To meet the first criterion concerning the subject matter of religious statements we ask "what is their use?" My contention is that the primary purpose is the attainment of certain pervasive attitudes in oneself and others. But what is an attitude? It is not just an emotion like fear or pleasure, although such emotions embedded in repeated situations of similar consequent patterns of behavior can create attitudes. For example, pleasure accompanied by successful solution to a problem may produce an attitude of optimism in the face of new problems. Attitudes are not just feelings such as hate or love. But again a feeling of hate towards a person of another race in repeated situations can produce attitudes of intolerance and aggressive action. Nor are attitudes to be confused with beliefs. A person may hold the ethical belief that "one ought to be tolerant" but not possess the attitude of "being tolerant of others." This is the old, but for our analysis very important, difference between what a man believes and how he acts. Emotions, feelings, and beliefs contribute to the formation of attitudes. An attitude is a disposition of a person to behave (act or think) in a particular way based on emotions, feelings, and beliefs.

I distinguish two kinds of beliefs: beliefs-*in* and beliefs-*that*. A belief-that is the affirmation by a person of a statement belonging to some kind of knowledge even though in some cases the belief is not acceptable by the rules of justification. I divide beliefs-that into rational, arational, and irrational according to whether by the rules of justification there is sufficient evidence *for*, or *in*sufficient evidence either way, or sufficient evidence against.

A belief-in is the affirmation of an object rather than a statement. These objects believed in are of many sorts: a person, a people, a cause, a policy, a social order, an ideal. For example: belief in Christ, belief in man, in desegregation, in democracy, and in knowledge. We usually believe in such objects because we also hold certain beliefs-that about the object. We believe *in* democracy because we believe *that* it is the best means to realize certain goals; we believe in man because we believe that he is capable of solving his problems, of living ethically together, of improving himself, his knowledge, and his social order. But the set of beliefs-that which we offer for our belief-in does not exhaust the object. We tend to attribute yet undiscovered properties and values to such objects. I define faith as a set of beliefs-in. Consider one case: faith in God. What does this involve? A belief that God exists, has a certain nature, has a relation to man and the universe, and has further undiscovered properties and values.

Two important consequences of this analysis of faith are that it enables us to clearly relate faith to reason and to evaluate various faiths. For a belief-in is often based on beliefs-that, and in some cases the beliefs-that are rational (having sufficient evidence). Next, we evaluate faiths according to the rational, arational, irrational status of the beliefs-that connected with the faith. So the age-old opposition between faith and reason disappears and the critical evaluation of faiths is provided for. This is why I took the time to structure the various rules of justification in terms of which this critical evaluation can begin.

We said that the primary use of religious statements is the attainment of certain pervasive attitudes and that attitudes are dispositions to behave molded by emotions, feelings, and beliefs. In the use of religious language, how are these attitudes attained? Two major uses can be distinguished: the evocative and invocative. Evocative statements are designed to call forth attitudes from the listener. The major example of this mode of language is the sermon. The preacher seeks to evoke certain attitudes in the congregation. Invocative statements are used to secure attitudes for the person who makes the statements or has the thoughts. The primary example is prayer. Of the many kinds of prayer take adoration; the prayer is twofold: there is the person who is adored and the effort to achieve an attitude of adoration by the individual who prays.

The twofold character of prayer brings out the important secondary meaning of religious statements. This concerns what the attitudes are about. It is this secondary meaning that accounts for the diverse types of religious statements we distinguished

earlier and explains why religions have appeared to make empirical and ethical knowledge claims. In theological statements in their religious function, not their metaphysical, we express attitudes about God. To say God is omniscient expresses an attitude of complete and absolute knowledge, of there being certain knowledge to be sought for but never wholly realized. Cosmological and historical statements express attitudes to be taken toward nature as a whole and toward temporal occurrences in the life of men. For example: the teleological order of nature and the Buddha's forest meditations. In ethical judgments as religious statements it is particularly important to distinguish the claim made from the disposition to act in accord with it. This is the whole point of the oft-heard comment: "He says he's a Christian but he certainly doesn't act like one." Since we can have attitudes about such diverse things as God, man, the universe, and values, this explains why religious statements have been confused with the other kinds of knowledge. The primary meaning concerning attitudes was missed and the diverse secondary meanings were taken as basic. Only if we recognize the primary attitude meaning can we unite these diverse religious statements. We have, I think, satisfied the first criterion for religious knowledge: the kind of claim made.

Can we provide rules of justification to meet our second criterion? Classical efforts to do this were such procedures as revelation, authority of person or text, intuition, and mystical insight. The difficulties in these procedures are well known. It is no wonder that they fail if the secondary meaning of religious statements is taken as basic. Can these procedures justify attitudes? I think not. They are satisfactory as long as one remains *within* a particular religion but they are ineffective for decisions among different religions advocating diverse attitudes. Unless a justification procedure can provide reliable decisions among differing claims, it is worthless for attaining knowledge. The classical procedures fail.

We might try to frame some general ethical criteria to justify some religious attitudes. But we encounter difficulties. First, we do not have generally satisfactory ethical criteria. Second, if we did, we would find either that the ethical principles depended on some religion and hence we should beg the question in favor of that religion, *or*, if the ethical principles are *independent* of religion, we should make our religious knowledge of ethical attitudes derivative from ethical knowledge. The latter alternative is possible and for many attractive but at the price of giving up a separate and distinct kind of religious knowledge.

Some religious statements concern attitudes related in secondary meaning to empirical knowledge, its content and method. This content can include cosmological and historical claims. In this case we can evaluate the religious attitude statement as acceptable or rejectable because the belief from which the attitude stems is rational, arational, or irrational. For example, it is a basic trait of empirical method that the results obtained are at best probable. On this rational belief is based the attitude of being open-minded or tolerant. Dogmatic, authoritarian, and close-minded attitudes are rejectable as religious knowledge. A considerable body of justified religious attitudes can be built in this way. But again at the cost of making religious knowledge derivative from empirical knowledge. I have not been able to conceive of other routes of justification. I conclude that because separate rules of justification have not been found to meet the second criterion we do not have religious knowledge on a par with formal and empirical knowledge. Only parts of what has been traditionally called religious knowledge can be justified in the above derivative way. But I think this way may lead to a new conception of religion. Others will prefer to continue the search for separate rules of justification.

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THE EXPERIENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGION[1]

ONE of the difficulties to be faced by any inquiry into the empirical foundations of religion is the formidable one of first having to answer the equally perplexing question, What is experience? It is, of course, always possible to avoid this question, particularly if it is supposed to call for a theory of the general nature of experience, by confining attention to specific experiences and their analysis. And indeed this view is not without merit because it is true that specific problems involving actual experience cannot be adequately treated upon the basis of general considerations alone; a theory of the nature of experience is no substitute for those actual experiences which must be taken into account whenever questions about empirical foundations are raised. And yet, however, the direct approach betrays its insufficiency as soon as it is seen that every appeal to individual experience to settle a question always carries with it a further appeal, whether implicit or explicit, to some criteria as to what is to count as an experience

[1] Read, with modifications, at the 53rd annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Philadelphia, December 28, 1957.

or as the content of experience. Moreover, this preliminary critical question cannot be sidestepped because all attempts to proceed in a wholly direct way are subject to the same objection: without criteria experience becomes so broad as not to exclude anything. It loses its differential meaning and is greatly reduced in its power to be used as a means of bringing general concepts and theories to the test. A critical approach is unavoidable even if it is also subject to the difficulty that it may become a new rationalism unless great care is exercised; a too zealous concern for the application of rational criteria may result in the elimination from experience of a great deal that is really encountered. Despite this difficulty, the fact remains that the critical approach is unavoidable; the best solution is to follow it through, making every effort to preserve for actual experience the right to speak for itself.

Modern thought has included two principal types of empiricism—the classical or British type which found its most incisive expression in the thought of David Hume and for which experience is ultimately an affair of sense impressions, and the broader, vaguer type sometimes called "radical" which characterizes, in different degrees, the thought of an entire group of critics of the classical type—Hegel, Bradley, Peirce, James, Dewey, Whitehead, and perhaps even Heidegger. According to this radical type, experience is not a single affair, an identifiable subject matter such as sense, or particulars, or impressions of the mind, but it is something initially far more complex and vague; it is a great mass of contents[2] resulting from the interplay between the self and the world in which it lives. Experience becomes the great matrix out of which all distinctions arise, but it is itself not wholly identical in nature with any of its contents. There are, to be sure, more recent forms of empiricism than either of these, but, insofar as they have been concerned with experience and not merely with the means of expressing it, they do not constitute a special case since they are interpretable as refinements of the classical type.

The main concern of the present discussion is to consider briefly the bearing of these two conceptions of experience upon the experience of God and the content of religion, in order to discover in what sense religion may be said to be based upon or rooted in experience.

[2] It is necessary to choose some neutral term here such as "contents" even if it is vague, because a more precise term would be too narrow. If, for example, one were to say "awarenesses" or "motor activities" or "qualities," one would speak truly, since these are all included within experience according to the radical type viewpoint; but the narrowing of experience down to any one of these, to one specific type of thing, is exactly what this viewpoint wants to avoid.

For the classical viewpoint, experience was a concept specifically aimed at eliminating rationalism in thought and at bringing what were regarded as "abstract" ideas to some sort of decisive test. The result was the identification of experience by such characteristics as the following:

(*a*) Immediate data of sense isolable from each other because of their sharp outlines and devoid of directionality or purpose.

(*b*) A set of contents, particular in nature, placed in opposition to thought or reason.

(*c*) The domain of sensible objects.

(*d*) A "mental" or private content set in contrast to the public or external world known to science.

The attempt, however, to interpret the whole of human experience by these characteristics soon made it evident that there could be no room for God *within experience,* i.e., as matter of experience, if the empirical viewpoint were strictly interpreted and rigidly followed. The main point, was, of course, the problem created by characteristic (*c*), for in no way could the supreme object of religion be found within the domain of sensible objects and thus as a genuine deliverance of experience in the sense required by the theory. This was not, however, the only difficulty, since a careful examination of classical type empiricism will reveal that a feature implied in all the characteristics of that view is that whatever can be experienced must be an *object* of some sort. The first and most serious consequence of such a theory is that selves cannot be matters of experience; only Berkeley seems to have taken that problem seriously. Since God can never be understood as an object but only as a center of purposes, the classical empiricism furnishes still another reason why God was forced beyond the confines of experience.

Recognition of these troublesome facts led to the proposal of four alternatives:

1. Deny the reality of God altogether on the grounds that we are dealing with either a human fantasy or a merely abstract idea.

2. Introduce one exception into the system so that the idea of God is admitted as a valid idea upon some basis other than that of "experience" as defined by the theory.

3. Introduce a special sense—a "religious sense"—by means of which God is apprehended without radically modifying the basic thesis that experience is co-extensive with the domain of sensed particulars.

4. Contend that God, while never a matter of direct experience, may yet be known through rational inference alone.

It will be noticed that the first alternative is the only one which is thoroughly consistent with classical empiricism, since all the others make it quite clear that if God is to be admitted as *matter of experience* from this perspective, it must be at the cost of an essential change in the theory itself. It is at this point that the approach of Kant to the problem is most instructive for our purpose, for among other reasons Kant is a pivotal figure who attacks the classical conception of experience and broadens the idea but does so from a standpoint which still retains as a proper part of itself several of the very assumptions essential to the theory he was trying to show up as inadequate. Kant, nevertheless, saw the problem clearly and his entire theory of the Ideas was an acknowledgment of the reality of certain regions of experience which must be forced beyond or outside of "experience" if it is still understood in the classical sense. God was, of course, the chief among the realities expressed in the Ideas; and, in making God into the Ideal of Pure Reason (in one of the senses in which God figures in the system), Kant was underlining the truth that, from the standpoint of the classical conception of experience, God is no longer a matter of experience but, if known at all, must be known in some other way. Without pursuing Kant in his solution, the point of importance here is that, although he did not leave the older view of experience standing, he *did leave too much of it uncriticised* and instead of modifying it radically he was content simply to add new dimensions to it.

Following the lead of Kant, it was for Hegel to launch a more radical attack upon the classical conception of experience; he did not negate it as has so often been thought, nor did he leave it standing where it was; instead he attempted a radical reconstruction of experience in which it would become clear that the classical conception was too narrow and that it left out of account a great deal which no responsible philosophy can ignore. Without implying that the other representatives of what I am calling the radical conception of experience are "Hegelians" in any sense whatever, the fact is that later proponents of the broader view have followed along the line of thought which he marked out. Several sentences from Hegel's *Shorter Logic* are most instructive in this regard. In discussing the Enlightenment conception of experience, the empirical philosophy based upon it, and the natural science standing behind it, he wrote:

> In its own field this empirical knowledge may at first give satisfaction; but in two ways it is seen to come short. In the first place there is another circle of objects which it does not embrace. These are Freedom, Spirit, and God. They belong to a different sphere *not because it can be said that they have nothing to do with experience;* for though they are certainly not experi-

ences of the senses, it is quite an identical proposition to say that whatever is in consciousness is experienced. The real ground for assigning them to another field of cognition is that in their scope and content these objects evidently show themselves as infinite.[3]

The most important item in this passage is Hegel's apprehension that while religion generally and its basic reality, God, cannot be based upon experience if experience is understood in the classical sense, it is nevertheless not true to say that these realities have nothing to do with experience. And this is precisely where the issue needs to be drawn; if we have before us so pervasive an aspect of human experience as religion is and so many claims to the experience of God, what are we to say of a theory of experience which compels us to deny to religion all experiential status? One alternative is to hold to the classical view, deny that God is a matter of experience, but contend that he can be reached and known in another way, namely, inferentially, and in such wise that direct experience is not required. The other possibility, when the issue is so drawn, is to ask whether a conception of experience which eliminates so much can be an adequate conception. It would seem that another line of thought is called for, a reconstruction of what is meant by experience. And this, of course, is exactly what was attempted by those who formulated the radical or second type of empiricism. According to the broader view, the classical conception must be reassessed for the purpose of discovering whether it is adequate for the full range of human life.

It may, of course, be objected at this point that the discussion has consistently assumed that God *must* be matter of experience and that religion cannot be based upon pure thought alone. A brief word on this head must suffice. If we take seriously, as we must in framing any empirical theory at all, the nature of the subject matter itself, there is one fact which the history of religion makes clear and that is the indispensability of direct experience as a ground for belief in God. The long and involved history of the various rational arguments for the existence of God shows that, although they may be put forward as if they provided a substitute for direct experience, this is not in fact the case because the arguments have no compelling rational force at all unless the self tracing out the rational pattern implicit in them understands what is meant by "God" and this is impossible without certain experiences of the sort generally described as religious. This, however, is not the point to be argued here; the central question is, assuming that religion must have empirical roots and cannot be severed

[3] Hegel, *Logic*, in *Encyclopedia*, Sec. 8 (Wallace translation). Italics mine.

from experience, is there a conception of experience which is itself intelligible and by means of which God and religion may once again be understood as matter of experience? This, among other questions, was one which occupied those thinkers previously cited as proponents of a new, broader, and more subtle theory of experience.

The main contention of the present discussion is that the broad or reconstructed conception of experience is required if religion is to be made intelligible as experience; the classical conception, important as it was for certain purposes, is too circumscribed to perform this task. Obviously a full-scale treatment of the more adequate conception is out of the question, as is also consideration of the new problems to which it in turn gives rise. It must suffice to point out four of its features. *First*, according to this view, experience is a reciprocal affair in the sense that it involves an organic togetherness of the experiencing self and the experienced world; *second*, and as a direct consequence, experience is impossible without interpretation from the side of the self and cannot be taken as the passive reception of "bare" data ready and waiting to impress themselves upon us; *third*, experience cannot be limited to "sense" and the supposed simple and clear-cut deliverances of the standard five senses because these data do not represent what is ultimate and primitive in experience but are rather, in the language of Dewey, "reflected products," the result of prior analysis. As a means of correcting the deficiency, this conception maintains the fluidity and continuity of experience and especially the presence of *relation* and *directionality* or purpose within it. In its eagerness to eliminate all but what presented itself directly to sense, the classical conception had virtually done away with the connecting tissue of experience and consequently could not do justice to the fact of tendency, of direction and movement towards a goal. This feature, as will become clear, is of the utmost importance to religion. *Fourth*, in addition to bringing relation back into experience, the broader conception focused attention as well upon what might be called the "intensive quality" of experience for the concrete self. Such quality has two principal forms. On the one hand, it means the whole range of comprehensive qualities describing what the esthetic and moral aspect of experience is for a self—that, for example, experiences are poignant or dull, decisive or trivial, etc.; and, on the other hand, it means the manner in which the self "takes" experience, the quality which describes its total reaction both to the world encountered and to the vicissitudes of its own self as an adventurer in that world. Such responses as the *anxiety* so much stressed by the philosophy of existence, the

optimistic and hopeful outlook of the liberal rationalist, the *ultimate concern* for being and the *courage* which Tillich has singled out as the defining characteristic of religion itself, the *satisfaction* or joy with which one may respond to the world as a place of self-realization—all these are excellent examples of intensive quality describing the total or final response of the self to the world and to the situation within which it exists. In accordance with the broader view of experience this intensive quality must be taken as a genuine part of experience because it shows itself to be a pervasive feature in human life and to be identifiable across cultural boundaries. It remains now to show how the features of purpose or directionality and intensive quality, omitted or slighted in classical empiricism or reduced to the level of the "merely psychological" in more recent forms, are needed for the clarification of exactly how God may once again be understood as matter of experience.

Without being able to enter into discussion of the perplexing question of whether there is any purely immediate experience, either of God or of any feature of the cosmos, I shall have to state my own view shortly and, unfortunately, dogmatically, and I shall do so with the mitigating comment that the view is in accord with the form of empiricism I am calling the broad or reconstructive view. It is that, as regards the experience of God particularly, experience is always *direct* but not *immediate*. The distinction may be explained briefly. I take a purely immediate experience to be one which excludes and is effectively beyond the interpretative pole in experience, the source which provides it with meaning and import or bearing for the life of the one who has it. Consequently a purely immediate experience would have to be empty of all discrimination, a condition which renders it indistinguishable from nothing. All experience contains meaning of some sort and all meaning implies determination and discrimination. This means that were there totally immediate experience it would have to remain fully inarticulate even for the self who has it. The denial of absolute immediacy does not mean, however, that all experience of God is inferential or at second-hand; there is no inconsistency in holding that a given item of experience can be *present* to a concrete individual and thus *directly experienced* by that self without that experience being immediate or exclusive of a reflective medium through which its meaning comes to the self. And although the distinction needs to be maintained throughout the whole of experience it is especially important for the experience of God since, on any view, God cannot be understood as an object in the ordinary sense, but must be taken as a ground

of all things which does not appear as one more thing. It is the chief characteristic of such a ground, especially when understood as a center of purpose, to be present and to lend itself to direct experience but not to be immediately known. To be encountered by another, a center of purpose must be present, but to penetrate beyond the encounter to the interior of that center is a process which takes not only time but endless attempts at interpretation or mediation. This fact proved to be a stumbling block not only for the classical conception of experience when it directed its attention towards the problem of God, but even the broader or radical conception of experience leaves something to be desired on this head as more recent theories aimed at pointing up the peculiarities of the experience of selves have shown.

If we maintain, as we must, that experience of God is experience of a center of purpose of the nature of a self, then we must go on to ask not only how selves are experienced, but how this would be possible in the case of a divine self. The answer can only be stated; there is no opportunity for development and defense. Wherever there is *self-conscious purpose* running through experience and wherever there is what was previously called *intensive quality* in life, there must also be found selfhood, for these are not possible without it. But these two features, it will be recalled, are among those which the broadened conception of experience has sought to rehabilitate as genuine aspects or constituents of experience. The point to be developed is that the divine self can be present in experience at two points—at the point where the self believes it has experienced the *ultimate purpose* of its life, that ultimate good without which life would not be, as we say, worth living, and secondly, where the self experiences its total reaction to life describable both by the self and others as *intensive quality*. The thesis, then, is that the divine self is present in these direct experiences.

It must, of course, be objected that the very fact, and the most important one, which we do not know to be the case, is being assumed without argument, namely, that these experiences are in fact the ones in which the divine center of purpose is present. The objection is correct and it reënforces the need for mediation and interpretation, for in order to know that the divine self is present in experience we need signs or marks, since neither that self nor those signs are sufficiently transparent to us for us to recognize their meaning immediately. That certain experiences are indeed the presence of God needs to be established. Nevertheless, however important it may be, this is not the main point to be raised in the present discussion. It has been confined instead to the task of showing that the broadened or reconstructed type of

empiricism makes the experience of God a real possibility since it has provided for the experiences selected—purposiveness and intensive quality—a genuine status in experience. This is exactly what classical empiricism could not do.

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REFLECTIONS ON FAITH AS THE GEOGRAPHY OF GOD[1]

THE following speculations on some relations of faith and deity are presented with awareness of the difficulty of discussing strong attachments with rational detachment. Reflections on a religious experience so vital in power and so intimate in significance could, with certain audiences, arouse enough feelings of affiliation or disaffiliation to transform a realm of discourse into a realm of decision. But my expository and critical purpose is neither to enhance nor to change any specific religious beliefs. It is rather to articulate an insight into some possible relations between the existence of faith and the existence of deity. Here, then is a delayed answer from the perspectives of experience to a question of childhood: "Where is God?"

A present impetus to these speculations has been the obvious dominance of the theme of faith in contemporary talking and writing. No doubt man has always exhibited what Santayana calls "animal faith"; and it is likely that the quest of faith is a perennial human concern, under whatever sky. But human faith moves in many a garb and context. In our western culture, dominated in its religious *Weltanschauung* by Judeo-Christian traditions, the interpretation of and the preaching about faith have a long and persistent tradition. Mention of typical spokesmen for that tradition like Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and the contemporary Reinhold Niebuhr suggests not only a continuity of commentary but also an apparent theological necessity. And in our era of the twentieth century the influential leaders of that chastened, symbolic, and historically-dismayed liberalism commonly called "neo-orthodoxy" have focused upon this theme for new generations of the credulous and incredulous, to the extent that the centrality of Christian love, once a characteristic emphasis of an earlier and more optimistic and rational liberalism, has frequently been displaced by stress on the primacy of faith.

[1] A slightly edited version of a paper given at a meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at Michigan State University in May, 1955.

Proclaiming the necessity and virtue of faith in our days of literacy is of course no prerogative of the keen theologian or the persuasive preacher. Many an energetic and renovated soul, in pursuit of goals dear to modern society, has discovered that by merchandising the magic word he can gain the honor of sanctified association and become a potent salesman of success.

In such company, though sharing the professional seriousness of the theologian and even though envying the salesman's Cadillac, a contemporary philosopher is likely to feel detached and alien—and this in spite of admission of an aspect of faith in his activities as person and as philosopher, in spite of the respectable presence in his own traditions of such spokesmen for the significance of faith as Hume and James, and in spite of professional interest in the debate between reason and faith. Such disagreements with the theologian or such distaste for the saleman no doubt continue an ancient and basic argument between conviction and clarity, between town and gown. Though a critical mind should withdraw from any majority obeisance to magic talk about faith, one need not withhold a probing of the significant needs and issues involved. If and when the obvious proclamations of faith could be transformed into a critical discussion between the religious obligation to be devout and the philosophical obligation to be intelligent, there could emerge an interplay of dialectic, or a criss-cross of ideas, quite tempting to minds reflective and sardonic. Toward that encounter this paper is directed.

The interpretation of faith upon which my later speculation rests is influenced by one of the contemporary Christian traditions about faith. Christians talk much about faith, and in the pride of proclamation often assume their version is universal and single. By "faith" they of course mean "Christian faith." Not all faith is Christian, not all is religious. Nor are all conceptions of Christian faith alike. It might be preferable to preface later comments with an extended survey of the various theories of faith in Christian history in order to give present discussion an historical springboard. But it may suffice to report that, in my cursory reading, the meanings of faith throughout Christian history seem variously to have been interpreted as faithfulness, obedience, trust, commitment, conviction, belief, assent to authority, knowledge, evidence, power, mystical union, vision, salvation. These do not appear to be equivalent terms. Which is the more truly Christian may be left to the decisions of orthodoxy. And any profound disclosures of the nature and nuances of Christian faith may be left to the appropriate theologians. Since I need a specific base for speculation, preference may and must exercise its wisdom. I

therefore shall offer an interpretation of the generic nature of faith, together with notes on implications for religious faith and for Christian faith. These materials will provide the groundwork for later argument.

Viewed empirically and functionally as an event in human experience, faith appears to be an attitude characterized by active expectancy and adventurous commitment. Akin to hope in the element of expectancy, faith is distinguished from hope by its companionship with courage. To have faith is to risk action. Its power, illustrated in the confidence and vitality attendant upon any radical conversion, gives "push" to belief. Faith is not to be equated with belief. To quote the distinction of one writer: "Faith is not belief in spite of evidence; it is life in scorn of consequences." Faith is the spirit of "fighting the good fight" and belief the banner under which one fights.[2] Faith is related to belief as commitment is to credo. A belief is a habit or an allegiance crystalized, a faith conceptualized. Beliefs are held *about* something; faiths are *in* something.

A resultant distinction between faith and knowledge should also be recorded. If knowledge means the successful conclusion of planned inquiry which has been validated by experimental and rational testing, faith can be understood as volitional hypothesis or initial human dynamics. When such faith develops into a dominating conviction, there may emerge a feeling of knowledge. But the philosophical status of faith is closer to wisdom than to knowledge. Dean Inge once wrote that "faith is an experiment which leads to an experience"; and in regard to the pursuit of knowledge an inquirer's faith can operate as the experimental commitment invigorating inquiry. But as every teacher of introductory philosophy has no doubt earnestly proclaimed, the feeling of certainty is no proof of certainty of fact. Relevant to this point is the assertion by Peirce that a thing is not true because it is satisfactory but becomes satisfactory because it is true.

The nature of faith as active confidence and adventurous commitment may be suggested if it is thought of as "faithing." Important aspects of such "faithing" may be summarized as follows. First, its attitude is that of trust becoming decision, of allegiance becoming action, of action risking the unknown, of significance becoming endurance. Such "faithing" is not synonymous with belief or knowledge or rational assent to authority or even to tenacity of opinion. Second, any particular expression of "faithing" is an orientation within a context of concern and sym-

[2] H. W. Schneider, "Radical Empiricism and Religion," *Essays in Honor of John Dewey* (New York: Putnam, 1940).

bols *to* something and an allegiance *in* something. The context provides the conditions and the challenge to which faithing is the response and the reconstruction. For a general definition of "faithing" the following is offered: Human faith is a ruling, experimental trust in and commitment to the object of its action.

The forms and symbols of such generic faith, or faithing, are as varied as human concerns and challenges. Faithing may be oriented to oneself, one's friend or love, a moral hero, political principles, one's god. Faith is a basic affirmation both natural and human. It is not religious *per se*. Formally to indicate its religious context would require an extended description of the general nature of religion, and that task would involve too long a detour in this paper. A summary of the trend of my general definition of religion may be sufficient. To be religious is to express active faith in and vital adjustments to that which is of intimate, serious, and ultimate concern. The expression of such worshipful dedication to supreme concern in and its support by ritual, symbols, creeds, sanctified conduct, cult, and other institutionalized patterns of shared significance constitute the social dimension of religion.[3] The religious quality of faith is best understood not as a social sharing nor as institutional attachments but as the internalized or personalized operation of a high, deep, and large commitment and trust. Thus, human faith acquires a religious aspect when oriented toward the largest extent of meaningfulness possible to a given individual and when intensely (or deeply) committed to his highest beliefs. In this context the words "largest" and "highest" are of course metaphorical; they are psychological terms of valuation, not physical terms of measurement. They indicate two dimensions of religious significance, namely, man's quest for personal meaningfulness in the cosmos and his intense affirmation of values held supreme for self and for society. The inherent assertion of religious faith is that its most intense dedication, its highest and farthest outreach, is self-justifying for personal and cosmic significance.

Such a description may initially appear vague to those accustomed by cultural environment to associate religious faith with a cross or a Bible or a church and its clergy. Such associations are understandable but provincial. But, for the sake of perspectives, I would add some comments on Christian faith. To a Christian, of course, a specific statement of the meaning of Christian faith would differ in wording and implications from a general state-

[3] See the excellent account of the meanings of religion and faith in J. H. Randall, Jr., "The Meaning of Religion for Man," in Randall *et al.*, *Preface to Philosophy: Textbook* (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

ment of the meaning of religious faith. For a Christian believer, the repentance accompanying and the salvation resulting from the integration provided in Christian faith would be both around and from an historically embodied and yet transcendent power and goodness which is other than man and society and nature. Christian faith to a Christian is faith in the God revealed in Jesus as the Christ and worshipped by the community of the faithful. But for *any* specific expression of human faith, including those of faiths which might be described according to their contexts as moral, democratic, communistic, scientific, or even philosophical, the formal description of the general context would vary from, but also give meaning to, the articulation of the nature of the specific faith. Throughout the various contexts possible to faith, the generic qualities of faithing would continue to be exhibited. Thus as the meaning of natural piety illumines the human basis of Christian piety, so the meaning of human faith illumines the natural basis of Christian faith.

For a Christian, of course, the basis of Christian faith is more than natural. Man's faith in God is asserted to be a gift of God which cannot be willed or controlled at pleasure. That the power of faithing feels like a gift is a frequent report from human experiences. In fact, no faith arises by fiat. Faith, like love, is a birth. And human love, for instance, exists not by virtue of affirming a general belief in the value of love but when a person finds or is found by the act and power and relation of loving. Then love appears both as passion and as possession. In view of such natural experiences, it is understandable on experiential grounds alone that Christians, partly to honor their God and to confess their spiritual impotence but also to record their sense of the mystery of faith's emergence, affirm that Christian faith in God is a gift of God. This report on the way in which the possession of religious faith seems also a possession through faith of its object is mentioned here because it presents a basic problem for the thesis now to be advanced.

Working definitions of human faith, religious faith, and Christian faith are before us. They serve as prologue for speculation on implications of the following question: if the only basis for asserting the existence of God were the religious faith of a Christian, would such faith prove the existence of God? I now turn to statement of the direction and nature of the speculations promised earlier.

Though still repeated, the traditional arguments for the existence of God—commonly called cosmological, teleogical, ontological, and moral—appear increasingly suspect in our post-Kantian era.

Without attempting to appraise their validity or invalidity, I shall assume for the sake of deference to faith that neither rational arguments nor experimental tests prove the existence of the God of Christian belief. Suppose that faith alone remains the sole and sufficient argument. There are in fact theologians who accept agnosticism toward reason and who maintain that faith succeeds where reason and science fail. Thus Richard Kroner asserts that "faith is the very best, the only possible, the only legitimate, and the only desirable knowledge of God."[4] Having earlier distinguished faith and knowledge, I would debate the statement if "knowledge" were interpreted as proof in a rational sense or as evidence in a scientific sense. But with substitution of words like "encounter" or "discovery" for "knowledge" let us accept the sentence as a valid report of Christian experience.

And as students both of human experience and religious psychology let us also admit that people attaining release of psychic power and gaining serenity of mind through adventures in faith do report a sense of being "grasped" by their faith. This report and the acceptance of the claim of faith as the very best discovery of God initiate the speculative thesis of this paper.

If we take seriously the belief that in Christian faith, and in faith alone, man encounters God, we may then ask whether the sense of "being possessed" in such faith implies the possession of, and thus the existence of, the object of faith? Does the assertion that it is the nature of human faith to be oriented *to* something and to be *in* something perhaps mean that in Christian context the "leap of faith" is actually a hidden bridge? If so, the mere *presence* of Christian faith may seem to function as an ontological umbilical cord which proves the existence of a God other than man and external to man. The argument of faith would then indeed succeed where reason faulted. Were the medieval mystics right after all in saying that in faith they actually touched and tasted God?[5]

My answer is that perhaps they were, but in a sense they did not intend, provided that the perspectives of a philosophical naturalism and an epistemology of elegance be added to the interpretations already introduced. For it is possible to assume that people mean what they say when they affirm they have found God in faith and then to suggest (still rejecting rational and empirical arguments for deity) that no more be read into the experience than

[4] Richard Kroner, *How We Know God* (New York: Harper, 1943), pp. 54–55.

[5] Paul Tillich, "Faith in the Jewish-Christian Tradition," *Christendom*, Autumn, 1942, p. 524.

is reported. A feeling of certainty is no proof of certainty of interpreted fact. A feeling that something is "good" is a report on the presence and quality of that feeling, but not of the independent existence of goodness. Thus if faith is the "only legitimate" encounter with God, does it not appear possible that God exists only in faith? This may be the answer to the problem of the ontological status of deity, which has often been only a vague vision for critical minds. To say that God, like heaven, is "up there" appears but a childish use of spatial imagination. If the metaphors of religious faith be treated ontologically, and from the perspectives of a philosophical world view which rejects any dualism of the natural and supernatural, it can be argued that the only place the God of faith exists is in faith. This speculation, supported with the application of the logical principle called "Occam's razor," suggests, therefore, that the texture and context of religious faith are, so to speak, the geography of God.

Such an interpretation of the functional existence, or physical place, of deity might be expanded to say that God exists only in love; but the principle remains the same. From an operational viewpoint, the existence of God is not independent of the existence of faith. The existence of faith determines the existence of God. Thus men who have faith in God find God only in faith. And if a man feels possessed by the orientation of his religious faith, it is possession within the ontology of faith and not a crossing or transfer into other realms of being.

So literal an acceptance and inversion of the Christian, and especially Protestant, declaration of faith as the pathway to God may seem startling to the true believer; and he may raise a problem by repeating a point mentioned earlier. Do not the reorganizations of desires and the re-energizing of meanings characteristic of the fullness of religious faith appear to be *given* by the object of religious faith, which is assumed to be God? And does not that imply that God is a giver—is, in other words, independent of a particular man's faith? It has been already admitted that the healing of confused or broken personalities which brings the health called "salvation" seems accompanied by what Professor Paul Tillich has described as "being grasped." But it was also noted that such a phenomenon is understandable to anyone who has "fallen in love" or has been converted to any new or inclusive belief. The sense of being overwhelmed is the power and wealth which released faith (or love or conversion) brings to itself. Both depth psychology and social psychology can testify to such experience. Why introduce an extra and complicating hypothesis? The involvement and hold of faith is illumined, for instance, by the

psychic rewards of participation in shared concerns, as when in a community of mind and spirit a participant becomes "swept up" by immersion in the mood and intention and action of his community. Such is the natural analogue of the "power of God" in the community of religious faith and piety.[6]

A second and related problem which might arise from analysis of the thesis that faith is the geography of God is whether all the natural and human facets of religious faith can explain the important meanings attributed to God. If the existence of God be confirmed to the presence of faith, is the nature of God thus limited to the interior texture of an individual's religious faith? A partial answer comes from asking another question: does every book in the Bible, historically interpreted, have the same conception of God? Not to my understanding. The Biblical idea of God developed throughout the history of personal and communal experience. Insofar as the religious faiths of individuals differ, the gods of their faith will differ accordingly. Probably no one faith, when analyzed, would reveal all the meanings which have been bestowed on the word "God." But it is to be remembered that an individual self is also a social self, and that a person's religious faith may be stimulated by a community which exists in and responds to history and nature. The meaning of the "geography" of God may thus be extended to the memories of the trustful and the communities of loyalty which are an individual's heritage. Consequently, the various interpretations of God as power, supreme value, creativity, judge, ideal principle, or symbolic connective of life's significance may be understood as discernible aspects of the psychic needs and resolutions of the rather mysterious and living creature we call man and as experiences encountered in communal quest. We may now see in new light the truth of Augustine's comment that we would not find God had we not already possessed him.

A third problem invites further speculation. If God exists only in faith, does God cease to exist when the appropriate re-

[6] The problem of this paragraph may be re-phrased in this way: If "God" is the object of religious faith, is God not hereby objective? The answer is: No more and no less than the "whole person" to which human faith may also be directed is objective and independent. For instance, suppose that a person has faith in "justice." Does *that* justice exist independently? No. It exists in *that* faith. The general idea may of course exist, so to speak, in the discourse of society at large. And the concrete manifestation of the meaning of justice would have an empirical existence in action and interaction. Presumably the meaning of "God" might also be similarly expressed in empirical actions; but then the poet would be right in saying that "some call it nature (or love or morality or autumn) and some call it God."

ligious context is dissolved and human faithing turns into doubting, or when it is oriented toward different concerns? The answer for an individual faithing is affirmative. We parallel Berkeley's argument that "to be is to be perceived" with the maxim that "to be God is to be the supreme concern of religious faith." If that sovereignty of concern is viewed empirically as a democracy of allegiances, then the unitive significance and the ontological status of God fades away. Should the category of deity be retained for reference to the concerns of faith, it would then be appropriate to speak of "gods" rather than "God." Hume's belief that polytheism is man's natural religion could thus be viewed as another report on the diversities of human faith and its loyalties. And the popular understanding of religion would then have to be re-formulated in order to be as intimate to man as his ideals and as extensive as his values, when these receive the attention of his faith.

I conclude with a postscript, as it were, of some general comments on this presentation of the thesis that the only answer faith gives about the existence of God is the fact of faith itself.

The first comment is that this discussion has been intentionally speculative. Its principles, therefore, are those of assumption, definition, and plausibility. Conclusive proof that faith is the geography of God was neither given nor anticipated. If scientific confirmation be waived near the beginning of inquiry, why should its atmosphere be demanded in the conclusion? The issues remain in the realm of faith and belief and reason.

Second, it may be noted that what might be called the emotional perspectives of inquiry are those neither of complete rejection nor of complete acceptance of a central article of Christian belief. To the question, "Does God exist?," the answer suggested by this discourse is, "Yes and no." There are some who would demand a "yes" or "no." It is an interesting problem whether disjunction would permit a purer religion but conjunction a truer wisdom. In any event, the existence of "God" is here not denied but redefined. The status proposed may of course appear sporadic. Deity seems to have an "on again, off again" existence according to the vitality or vagueness of a person's religious faithing. This idea, though shocking to orthodox assumptions of the ever-lasting and universal and unitary character of the Christian God, is nonetheless compatible with the functional atheism and the occasional "God-consciousness" of the average church attendant.

Third, there is a possible principle of tolerance in this view of faith as a divine ontology. The proclaimed need of a confessional faith for a Christian may be taken seriously. We can ac-

cept, in other words, the wisdom of those who say "I have faith in God" or "God is God to me." But if others retort that they confess no such faith, they are also to be accepted as brotherly participants in our human predicament. For faiths differ. Not all exhibit the same range and intensity. Not all deal with the same symbols. But all are human. The tolerance here envisioned could be refreshing and relaxing in a world full of beliefs ready for battle. But it may remain a vision rather than a practice. Tolerance is hardly a virtue to a strong and habitual conviction unless the conviction is disciplined by love and intelligence. A new-born faith, especially if oriented to the ultimacy and universality characteristic of Christian belief, seems to find sanction in such belief for its zeal to enlist all men under the banner of common affirmation. A fanatic has been defined as one who does what God would do if God only knew the facts. That comic jest has often turned into the principle of tragic history. It is a paradox of religious faith that scepticism is often needed to preserve its truth.

My final comment deals with another paradox. Some of the assumptions of this paper have been influenced by contemporary Christian emphasis on the primacy of faith. It would be a paradox if a "neo-orthodoxy" which delights in paradox were to contribute to the beliefs of theoretical opponents like humanism and naturalism. Of course it is doubtful if the dissection presented here will cause any revolutions in actual faithing. What Crane Brinton has described as the "metaphysical ache" of finite and transient man will probably continue to transform the foci of faith into principles of reality for many uncritical hearts and minds, so that the longings of one's spirit are taken as echos from an external world. Yet we may also expect that as the world continues its uneven way, rational scrutiny will also have its say, so that the status of divine geography will continue to be a debate between piety and criticism.

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NEED REDUCTION AND NORMAL VALUE

I

CONTEMPORARY ethical discussion has failed to examine the full context of valuation and meaning. Value judgments are examined independently of their sources and referents; ordinary meanings are analyzed in abstraction from their function. Mr.

A., we are told, may like apricots, algae, athletics, the A.A.U.P., be altruistic, and use affected speech; Mr. B. prefers berries, beef, basket weaving, the B.B.C., is bitter, and barely utters a word; but these are expressions of private attitudes. In some cases, so the tale runs, such attitudes are modifiable by an appeal to belief, but not always; ultimately only a persuasive appeal may resolve disagreements. Meanings are discovered only by examining common usage. And many allege that beyond this nothing more may be said.

But why must immediate attitudes or expressions in ordinary language be taken as the final locus of value or the ultimate subject matter of ethics? Emotivists, non-cognitivists, and ordinary language philosophers apparently agree in their initial assumptions. They bypass the data of the social sciences, feeling that one ought not to commit the naturalistic fallacy. But can the current impasse in value theory be overcome without raising descriptive questions concerning human behavior? For instance, if we were to follow this prevailing point of view, it would be a mistake to introduce notions of pathology, neurosis, normalcy, or health into value discussions. Yet people constantly refer to these normative concepts in everyday life and in the therapeutic sciences. Either the above philosophical analysts have ignored an important type of common-sense language, or else they cannot deal with such topics within the confines of their assumptions. In either case, most people assume that questions of normalcy are relevant to value (and moral) judgments. Are they completely in error, or is theirs a deeper insight into behavior?

It is the thesis of this paper that there is a meaningful sense of "normal." But in order to indicate it the causal basis of value must be explored. Ethical analysis ultimately takes as its subject matter the concrete experiences of men. And such analysis sooner or later is found to imply a theory of motivation. But most of the prevailing discussions of human motivation are limited to surface questions: Is reason, desire, or emotion central in choice? Can cognition control behavior? What is the relationship between belief and attitude? Do ethical judgments have a descriptive or imperative function? Many writers refer to Hume's claim that reason by itself moves nothing without feeling or sentiment; others express their faith in reason and cognition.

Actually, the problem of motivation is only a part of the broader question: What are the *determinants* of human behavior? But, as the social sciences indicate, there are undoubtedly many causal factors. Most of the theories of motivation have been based on earlier limited psychologies: primitive hedonism and attitudinal-

ism, speculative self-realizationism, or naive cognitivism. Does contemporary psychology shed any light on the problem of motivation? At least one type of motivation theory, need-reduction, does provide an important advance. This theory is not without its difficulties. Yet it does provide us, I think, with a more encompassing theory than is usually encountered in philosophy; and this has considerable significance for value theory.

II

There is a continual struggle on the part of living organisms to reduce tension and maintain homeostasis. Disturbances of essential constancy of inner tissue or psychological balance lead to tension or anxiety. Such disturbances are induced by internal or external stimuli. Internal stimuli are frequently constant forces found operative in all normal members of a species; as such, they are continually flowing sources of endosomatic stimulation. External stimuli are environmental entities (real or imagined) which confront the organism. The organism is motivated to overcome such stimuli disturbances, thereby reducing tension and maintaining a dynamic homeostatic tension balance.[1]

In the course of living a variety of differential needs develop which must be satisfied if life is to be maintained. Needs in general are states of tension-disequilibrium. These eventually lead the organism to restless drive activities in an effort to reduce the initiating stimulation and resulting imbalance. But the dichotomy between internal and external is only one of degree. Recurrent internal needs frequently have been called "instinctive" (although this term is inappropriate when applied to man). Such basic needs have developed in a species only after long processes of evolution. Definite structures emerge in all normal members of a species. These take on the specific function of restoring organic harmony. Moreover, pleasurable sensitivity appears to accompany and accentuate processes of restoration. Needs which are based on external conditioning also have as their function the maintenance of homeostasis.

[1] The best statement of biological homeostasis is by W. B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body*, W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1932. The best statement of psychological homeostasis is by R. Stagner, "Homeostasis as a Unifying Concept In Personality Theory," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 58, 1951, pp. 5–17. Other recent articles on homeostasis: P. W. Kurtz, "Human Nature, Homeostasis, and Value," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 17, Sept., 1956, pp. 36–55; L. C. Kubie, "Instinct and Homeostasis," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, Vol. 10, 1948, pp. 15–30; C. A. Mace, "Homeostasis, Needs, and Values," *British Journal of Psychology* Vol. 44, 1953, pp. 200–210.

Both internally and externally conditioned needs interact and influence one another. Indeed, it might be appropriate in general to conceive of a need as the tension-lack of a *field* of organic processes containing inner and outer events. The organism, strictly speaking, does not end at the cellular surface of its skin. There is a continuous internal and external environment, as in respiration, where both the lungs and external oxygen play a role, or in perception, where both sense organ and objects or qualities in the environment are necessary. Hence effective stimulation anywhere within the organic field may eventuate in organic activity in order to reduce disequilibrium or maintain a tension level.

Living organisms thus constantly seek to maintain themselves through homeostatic means. This is the root principle of life found in all normal members of a species. But there are also other life-functions tending toward fulfillment.

Reproductive structures and capacities are also found in living things. There is a tendency to transmit a discontinuous life of biological endowment through members of a species. This, too, is present in all normal members and is a basic principle of the species at large (although it may be absent in pathological cases).

In addition, living things have the capacities for growth, maturation, and functioning. At certain stages in life, general ontogenetic needs and properties are revealed in each normal member of a species. A person develops new capacities at different phases of life. Each stage generally follows a normal pattern of development: the ability to see, grasp, sit, crawl, stand, walk, speak, reproduce sexually, etc. Thus there is a steady increase in functions during the maturing process. But when is maturity reached? Empirical evidence tends to indicate the fact of continuing growth; at least, well into old age. Growth is not merely physical; it manifests itself in the increase of emotional, intellectual, aesthetic, religious, economic, political, and other capacities and skills.

There also appears to be a vital tendency on the part of living organisms to release surplus energy. Given adequate levels of balance and growth, there are constant manifestations of expressive activities. A dog will romp; an infant kick its limbs; a child play; a man laugh or create a work of art. These vital activities are intimately connected to the whole dynamic organic process and must be accounted for in any general theory of human behavior.

III

There seems to be a need on the part of human beings to satisfy the above life-tendencies. Motivation is closely connected to such need-reductive activities. Needs are frequently expressed in every-

day human life on the conscious level as wishes, desires, attitudes, wants, and likes. But they also remain deep-seated and partly hidden. There are somatic and "unconscious" sources of needs in the organism. These are brought to the surface occasionally in dreams, wishes, fantasies. They are discovered by the psychiatrist often only after the greatest effort.

Many recent psychological theorists tend to reduce all motivation to primary biological needs of hunger, thirst, sex, etc. Secondary needs for them are learned needs and drives relative to the socio-cultural environment. Clark L. Hull related secondary drives to conditioning mechanisms.[2] Through associative and trial-and-error learning the organism discovers that certain objects will reduce his primary needs and that others will not. Continued pleasurable reinforcement of stimuli-response patterns tends to increase the strength of the response.

But Hull and others continually have underestimated the innate character and role of internal stimulation. At least, in all normal members of a species there seem to be growth processes in which standard invariant stimuli come into play at various stages in the maturing process. Moreover, social psychology today seems to make it clear that man is a social being; hence, many of the so-called "secondary" or "derived" needs have to be considered as primary needs. But how can we speak of primary social needs in the face of the apparent relativity of socio-cultural behavior?

Human behavior and motivation is a function of the total field of interaction. The full act involves the following phases: There is a need. This leads to impulse and activity. Goal objects to satisfy the need are sought; when achieved, homeostasis results; when not achieved, tension (or anxiety). Life activity accordingly presupposes at least two sets of conditions: *needs* and *objects*. Organic needs require objects or goals (actual or perceived) as a means for reducing them. Such goal objects may be natural and socio-cultural in character. Processes of behavior may be understood from the standpoint of both tension-lack (bio-chemical) and purposive striving (molar). In this paper I am concerned with isolating the *invariant needs* of the organism as typical of the species. Any complete theory of behavior requires a delineation of all factors of the field. This entails an investigation of the socio-cultural objects of striving to determine the invariant conditions governing their organization. Durkheim and others

[2] See: C. Hull, "Value, Valuation and Natural Science Methodology," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 11, July, 1944, No. 3; *A Behavior System*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952.

have argued (correctly I think) that social phenomena cannot be reduced simply to psychic or biological determinants, and that a separate conceptual framework must be developed here. Accordingly, the invariant potentialities of human behavior are dependent upon both the individual organism and species *and* sociocultural materials and events.

Now I submit that there are certain native needs which cannot be ignored without peril to the organism. This does not mean that there are not a *variety* of ways and many different objects capable of satisfying these basic needs. Man requires food for survival, but the kinds of food which will reduce this need depend upon alternatives presented by the environment. Apricots and algae may reduce Mr. A's hunger at times. But B's needs may be satisfied by berries and beef. There are a multiplicity of objects capable of meeting this biological need. Needs are vague tensions until specific objects are discovered which will reduce them. As Joseph Butler long ago indicated, when people desire or like they have specific objects in mind. The continued satisfaction and pleasurable reward of berries and beef may soon reinforce these goal objects. An interest in the objects is sustained in its own right. Long after the initial motive has been forgotten the interest-goals may remain. These interest-goals become structured in the personality. A unique set of such interest-goals distinguishes one personality from another. Yet a person's preferences are often only end results or surface manifestations of deeper need-requirements. If ways of satisfying such psychological phenomena are regularly supplied, they become structured in the personality. Continued pleasurable stimulation emphasizes and reinforces interest in particular objects. Specific kinds of activities meeting these specific wants develop. Social rules and institutions also do much to regulate random wants into patterned modes of response. Thus a peculiar type of behavior finally may come to exert a dominant role in a way life. A drug addict or alcoholic, for instance, emphasizes dope or alcohol all out of proportion to normal functioning; and a military society centers its interests on military virtues and passions.

Are these unique interests and wants to be interpreted in terms of need-reduction? Is an individual who craves dope, alcohol, or military honor, for example, expressing a need? Surely a distinction must be made between the *general* function of needs on the one hand and the *specific* object-contents of needs on the other. The general function of a need is to reduce tension, maintaining homeostasis and the life and growth of the organism; but the *way* tension levels are maintained, the specific object or content of the

need-goal as expressed in a desire, want attitude, or interest, is another matter. We are motivated to seek specific objects, but the ultimate function of a motive is to satisfy a general need. Any particular need is a complex function of both general needs and derived conditioning processes. This distinction is similar to that made earlier between primary and secondary needs. Primary needs refer to general functions; secondary needs are those which arise on the level of object-contents. Such derived needs are usually generated by external stimuli (although they have their internal correlates). That is why some societies over-emphasize one pattern of behavior (e.g., head hunting, money gathering, etc.) to the exclusion of others, and why some individuals will direct their lives along one line (e.g., dope addiction, or art, etc.) rather than others. These derived needs are so structured in the personality that unless they, too, are satisfied tensions will result.

IV

The basic philosophical question that may be raised, and one that has the highest significance for value theory, is: Are there basic general needs intrinsic to all men, and does this enable us to make a distinction between normal and pathological needs? My answer is in the affirmative. There are, I believe, basic general needs which are found in all normal human beings. What are they? This may only be determined empirically. On the basis of recent investigations in the life and social sciences, I wish to propose the following tentative list of trans-cultural needs:[3]

[3] Several recent writers have suggested other lists of normal needs. The above list is a convergence of the main features of these lists. Perhaps the most important work in this connection has been done by A. H. Maslow. He lists a hierarchy of basic needs: (1) physiological needs, (2) safety, (3) belongingness and love, (4) esteem, (5) self-actualisation. He also adds cognitive and aesthetic needs (*Motivation and Personality*, Harper and Brothers, N. Y., 1954, pp. 80–98). For Harry Stack Sullivan the basic needs of man are: (1) the need for personal security, or freedom from anxiety, (2) for intimacy, (3) for lustful satisfaction (*Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., N. Y., 1953, p. 140). Erich Fromm: (1) animal needs, (2) relatedness (love), (3) transcendence (creativeness), (4) rootedness (brotherliness), (5) sense of identity (individuality), (6) frame of orientation and devotion (reason) (*The Sane Society*, Rinehart and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1955, Ch. 3). Ralph Linton: (1) emotional response from other people, (2) security, (3) novelty of experience (*Cultural Background of Personality*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, N. Y., 1945, pp. 7–10). For Werner Wolff normalcy is defined in terms of (1) development, (2) integration, (3) coördination, (4) adjustment, (5) activity, (6) self-assertion, (7) productivity, (8) equilibrium. Distortions of function in abnormality are: (1) fixation, (2) isolation, (3) dissociation, (4) maladjustment, (5) passivity, (6) self-de-

Biogenic Needs

(1) There are certain fundamental *physico-chemical homeostatic* needs required for the maintenance of life: salt, sugar, calcium, protein, fat, acid content, water, oxygen are among the most important. These physico-chemical needs are expressed in differential tensions, such as hunger and thirst, and are satisfied in different functions, such as eating and drinking. As far as I can discover there are few, if any, exceptions to the homeostatic principle on the physico-chemical level. It is important to recognize that homeostasis is never a merely static state. Indeed, it is doubtful if it is every fully attained. It is a dynamic metabolic affair of ongoing exchanging process.

(2) There also seems to be present in each normal member of the species the need to *grow*, mature, and develop. Inherent in man are evolutionary constructive forces which urge him to realize his given potentialities. But obviously this statement is too general, since it is necessary to interpret growth and realization in more specific terms. Empirical studies seem to indicate that each stage of life, from embryo to adult, reveals new capacities and needs and their continued functioning. Gesell, for example, has studied the early cycle of growth. But it is not clear whether his findings are entirely devoid of the unique influences of our cultural prejudices.[4] Lehman's remarkable study of creativity—from mathematicians and musicians to philosophers and poets—shows the uniform relationship between age and achievement.[5] Gerontological studies show other interesting results of the loss of functions in the aging process. A good deal of the basis of growth is biological in character. But this is not entirely so, since in all human functioning objects are required, and these usually are socio-cultural in kind.

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struction, (7) sterility, (8) unbalance (*The Threshold of the Abnormal*, Hermitage House, N. Y., 1950, p. 436). Carl R. Rogers describes all organic and psychological needs as partial aspects of one fundamental need: "The organism has one basic tendency and striving—to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism" (*Client Centered Therapy*, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1951, p. 487). M. F. Ashley Montagu defines a *vital* basic need as any biological need necessary for the individual or group to survive (he lists several). An *emotional* (non-vital) basic need is any biological need which is necessary for the organism to develop and maintain mental health. A *socially emergent* need arises out of the process of satisfying the above basic needs and may under certain conditions become necessary for the maintenance of mental health (*The Direction of Human Development*, Harper and Brothers, N. Y., 1955, pp. 150–151).

[4] Gesell, Arnold L., *Child Development*, N. Y., Harper and Brothers, 1949.

[5] Lehman, Harvey C., *Age and Achievement*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953.

Indeed, socio-cultural materials continually make possible the revealing of new potentialities of man.

Unless the above homeostatic and growth tendencies are fulfilled, the organism cannot be called healthy. Extended privation or hindered development leads to serious disease and malfunctioning. It is possible to give, within limits, a clinical interpretation of these biogenic needs. Indeed, a basic biogenic need may be defined as that which is necessary for the *continued maintenance and growth of the organism.*

Sociogenic Needs

But there are other highly complex needs which also emerge and appear to play a decisive role in human life. These needs have a physio-chemical side; but they are largely emotional and socio-cultural in origin and quality. They are usually satisfied in relation to other people. They appear to come closest to what have been called the "self-realization" needs of man.

(3) There is the need for a type of psychological *security.* A lack of security is not merely grounded in physical fear. The whole personality may be challenged in other subtle ways. There is the need to overcome threats to the structure of personality involvements. The normal organism is able to organize his world and his place in it, as far as possible, in order to avoid real dangers and to ignore unreal ones. Continued fear may be a source of mental disorder.

(4) That there is a need for reciprocal *love* is a widespread assumption of contemporary psychiatry. There seems to be a human necessity both to give and receive love. Some psychologists have related this to the need for satisfaction of the sexual libido. Thus Sullivan calls it the need for lustful satisfaction which is concerned with genital activity in pursuit of orgasm. Clearly sexual needs are present in man and have a biogenic basis. But love is something more than this. There is, according to Sullivan, also the need for intimacy, i.e., for collaboration with at least one other person. Although love is difficult to define precisely, we may characterize it as any state of responsiveness with others as its goal. Whether this craving for love is innate or culturally determined, and whether it may best be satisfied by human love objects, is a difficult question, especially since our Western and Christian culture tends to overemphasize the role of love. However, there is considerable evidence which *seems* to indicate its root need in most living things. For example, rats and other mammals are known to develop severe gastro-intestinal and other

troubles if deprived of the caressing, fondling, and licking care of the mother in the early days of life, thus indicating a need for cutaneous stimulation. Young children will cry bitterly when deprived of love; if continually frustrated along these lines, severe maladjustments will develop. The mothering care received during early childhood hence has its later effects upon adulthood. But, further, the dual character of sexual reproduction suggests the need for continued love, biogenic with psychical components, as does the inter-dependent basis of many human relationships.

(5) Man is so thoroughly a dependent being that there appears to be a continuing need for *belonging* to some community. Man's nourishment, his unfolding, indeed, his very language, art, religion—the symbols by which he dreams and thinks—are socio-cultural in character. Is there a need for man to identify himself with some community, some group, or cause? To be completely alone and unto oneself is to invite alienation, one of the fundamental sources of neurosis. And, if carried far enough, it actually makes a man less than human (as we know him), since he will not possess the requisite objects, symbols, and rules that society and culture have discovered as full aids to growth and functioning.

(6) The need for *self-respect* and acceptance of the self is an essential requirement of the normal personality. Self-hate can be as destructive and consuming as physical hunger and disease. People frequently set up high ideals for fulfillment, and, being unable to reach them, seek to destroy themselves in condemnation, as Karen Horney has pointed out.[6] All persons (at least in our society) have a need or desire for a stable, firmly based high evaluation of themselves, for self-esteem and for the esteem of others. There is a desire for strength, achievement, competence, and confidence in the face of the world. There is the desire for recognition, prestige, appreciation, and respect from other people, as Alfred Adler has shown.[7] These needs may very well be exaggerated once again by our culture. A *minimal* statement, however, can be given: If there is excessive self-hate, or feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, and helplessness as a person, mental disorder and malfunctioning will undoubtedly develop. As is obvious, there is a close similarity between the above needs—security, love, belonging, and self-respect.

(7) Arising out of the expressive tendencies of man is probably the need for *creative expression*. Homeostatic and growth pro-

[6] *Neurosis and Human Growth*, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., N. Y., 1950.

[7] *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1929.

cesses are basic to human life. Man is a problem-solving creature. Consciousness is one of the main instruments by which human beings may cope with their environment. In this sense, man is a productive working animal. But it is also necessary to leave room for expressive activities and needs. Expressive activities have a role in the growth and functioning of healthy organisms. The opportunities for self-expression and release must be present in all normal functioning. Play, art, poetry, song, and dance may draw their initial impetus from this underlying need.[8] Expressive needs are surely part of man's actualizing tendencies. Indeed, they frequently serve as a test of growth and development.

(8) We find in man the unique *cognitive* tendency or need. This is made possible by man's involved nervous system (his capacities for consciousness, memory, anticipation, imagination, perception, and reflection) and his cultural endowment. This intellectual capacity enables him to rise above the limitations of his immediate spatial-temporal context. Man seems to want to come to terms with nature, and to reach an understanding of himself and his place within it. The demands of everyday life initiate the use of thought. This may very well be the source of the scientific and philosophical enterprise. Dangers, tragedy, and death lead to awe and wonder. Perhaps this is the basis of mythological, religious, and metaphysical systems. Some question may be raised as to whether the cognitive constitutes a separate need. Much scientific and cognitive behavior appears to be a high-level instrument for problem solving; but a good deal of thought is expressive in function. Much religious and philosophical behavior may be subsumed under the demand for psychological security and stability. Further, cognition may at times lead to more anxieties than it resolves. In the last analysis, however, cognitive symbolic systems do seem to have a homeostatic function, one that appears only at the higher levels of growth. Inmates of mental institutions are out of cognitive touch with part of the real world. A minimal statement hence is in order: Some cognitive contact with one's own and external reality must be present to preserve mental health.

The fundamental characteristic of these sociogenic needs is that *they must be satisfied if the organism is to maintain adequate mental health and continue to develop along normal lines.* Failure to satisfy these needs leads to mental imbalance and inability to grow properly. Freud suggested a definition of neurosis in terms of

[8] There may also be a need for stimulation of the sense organs. But this need appears to be connected to the general tendency to live, grow, and function.

the lack of homeostatic balance of psychic energy.[9] This usually leads to the upsetting of the physico-chemical balance of the body. The disturbed person attempts to overcome his anxieties by constructing unique pathological systems of behavior: escape and protective mechanisms, repressions, compensations, reaction formations, etc. The sick person is attempting "to re-establish a lost equilibrium."[10] In extreme cases only a complete withdrawal into psychotic unreality can prevent distressing anxiety. In abnormal behavior there is frequently a dissociation of the pleasure principle from natural needs; pleasure is extracted from its normal behavior and unduly emphasized. Only these compulsive reactions are believed to give the person some "peace"; though they frequently provoke anxiety. Presumably the relatively healthy adjusted person can function on all levels, work, love, and is in cognitive touch with reality—the abnormal person, particularly the psychotic, is not.

There is also such a thing as pathological growth and development. Fromm claims that "mental health is achieved if man develops into full maturity, according to the characteristic laws of human nature. Mental illness consists in the failure of such development."[11] It is a regression or fixation to earlier stages of development and a disturbance in one's relations to oneself and to others. For Horney, the neurotic process is a special form of development and growth which hampers natural growth.[12] Favorable conditions are necessary for healthy growth. Society may either fulfill or frustrate the needs inherent in human nature. On this theory the so-called "death wish" or destructive impulse in man arises only from the frustration and thwarting of such normal needs and may not be itself innate.

V

What are the implications of the above list?

It is possible to use this tentative list of basic needs in philosophical analyses of human conduct. The list is a descriptive instrument for understanding man. It is predicated on the assumption that any conscious motive, attitude, wish, liking, desire, or want must be interpreted in its broader context, and that, if we are to understand choice and meaning, both the manifest and latent functions of conscious states must be dealt with. Unfortu-

[9] Nigel Walker claims that Freud recognized and used homeostasis in his theories a generation before Cannon or the cyberneticists ("Freud and Homeostasis," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. VII, No. 25, May, 1956, pp. 4–12).

[10] Werner Wolff, *The Threshold of the Abnormal*, *ibid.*, p. 438.

[11] *Sane Society*, p. 14.

[12] *Neurosis and Human Growth*.

nately, many philosophers have taken the surface expressions of needs and motives as the core of value. But in view of what I have argued, to deal with such vital biases without tracing them to the conditions governing their occurrence is a partial approach (as Dewey recognized).

This theory presupposes that there are norms built into the framework of the human species. But what is the justification for using the term "norm"? It is a purely empirical one. The only reason for saying that something is normal is that all or most members of the species tend to behave in that way. In other words, human beings *do* strive to maintain life, to achieve equilibrium, to grow and express themselves. *Shoulds* are part of the very structure of human beings. Men tend to their own maintenance and growth. Value is connected to the biogenic and sociogenic basis of the striving process. Value is another term for the complex of need-desire-satisfaction. There are primary general values and secondary derived values, the latter being interpreted by whether or not they fulfill the former. Value is thus always related to the whole ongoing direction of vital activity.

But it must be recognized that to treat value in this way is to make a proposal. Normal value is here considered to be present under conditions of healthy functioning. That is, when specifiable objects or activities contribute to the general need-reductions and satisfaction of organisms without undue tension or anxiety, and when they contribute to homeostasis, survival, reproduction, growth, and expressive activities, then we may say that the organism is normal.

Actually, however, the above statement is intended as an empirical explanation of the way in which most members of the species tend to function under standard conditions. As such, it is a hypothetical statement summarising a fundamental law of human behavior, and is either true or false on scientific grounds.

Why *ought* the organism to behave so? is a question that frequently has been raised. Indeed, the meaning of the term "ought" has been an important problem of linguistic analysis. But, as far as I can discover, there are no absolute logical justifications to be given about matters of fact. Causal connections are best interpreted as probability relations, not logical inferences. Thus the only answer to the above question is that human beings do behave in the way we have specified; and that they can, will, and probably should so behave. Any other meanings of "ought" are usually predicated on an implied theory of private motivation and individual freedom of the will. Nor is the naturalistic fallacy here at issue. If the above statements are true, then they are merely

factual accounts of life, not persuasive definitions or private obligations.

Of course, there is the important problem of moral choice and decision. I think that we can investigate value phenomena and develop a theory of value without becoming involved in such questions at every point. This does not mean, however, that the above theory of value does not have important implications for the decision problem. For it is *possible* for men to appeal to normal values as partial evidence in reaching decisions. Such evidence may have some direct relevance to the solution of their practical problems. At least, both in ordinary life and the applied sciences, men constantly criticize other individuals, their decisions and practices, by referring to normalcy and health as standards. Particular attitudes thus may be interpreted, their meanings analyzed, evaluated, and criticized by their role in a personality system. The question may be asked, how far do such items satisfy the normal needs of man, or contribute to homeostatic maintenance, growth, etc.? Similarly, a socio-cultural system may be evaluated to a degree as normal or abnormal by whether it satisfies standard human needs.

But once again, I wish to emphasize that *a* fundamental problem for value theory independent of the problem of personal moral decision is to understand our real deep-seated needs. The significant problem that this line of approach raises is not the linguistic problem of analyzing abstracted meanings or feelings, but rather the question: are there universal needs of man? This is a thoroughly philosophical question presupposing no prior commitments to hypostatic meanings, ordinary usages, or covert theories of human motivation. It is a question which can only be answered by an understanding and synthesis of the empirical findings of the sciences of man. Accordingly, it is not germane to raise the same old objections, as recent philosophers are wont to do, against this type of naturalistic inquiry.

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